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Recent market indicators point once again toward a substantial growth of information technology
(IT) outsourcing in the developed economies. Outsourcing has now become a major option consid-
ered for handling some or most of an organization’s information systems and technology require-
ments.  The growing concern, however, of organizations either evaluating or actively involved in
IT outsourcing, is the management and ensuing development of what many researchers in the
literature have coined the outsourcing partnership. The envisaged relationship between the client and
the vendor has been found to take on a certain gestalt which, when formalized, consists of two key
parts: the contract and its operationalization.  The uniqueness, however, of the IT outsourcing
relationship is defined by the sum of its parts.  In this context, a model has been developed that is
based on exchange theory and contract law.  It provides an overview of what an outsourcing
relationship entails. The model is substantiated, through research into client and vendor companies,
to ascertain the current relationship building practice. The resulting model derives its usefulness
from its heuristic and analytical potential, in a fashion that captures both the outsourcing relation-
ship’s contractual, social, and economic characteristics, and  additional elements found to have
relevance in practice.
Keywords:  MIS management, IT outsourcing, IT outsourcing relationship, relational contract
theory, social exchange theory, interpretivism.
1. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the “Kodak effect” in 1989 (Applegate and Montealegre 1991), information technology (IT) outsourcing
has continued to grow to such an extent in market size and organizational influence, that it nowadays has become
considered an integral component of the information management process (Feeny and Willcocks 1997; Rockart et
al. 1996; Rockart and Ross 1995), requiring as necessary, in many circumstances, an in-depth comparison to the
performance of the in-house IT department (Willcocks et al. 1996).  Once the decision to outsource has been made
and contract negotiations have led to an agreement, the ensuing concern of IS practitioners is how best to manage
an outsourcing venture to achieve a win-win situation, while ensuring that savings, service levels, and other
outsourcing objectives are attained, as stipulated in the contract.  In practice, this may require both sides to look
beyond the traditional arm-lengths supplier-buyer type arrangements and to move more toward a relationship (i.e.,
partnering) that operates within the “spirit of the contract.”  IT outsourcing is broadly defined as a decision taken by
an organization to contract-out or sell the organization’s IT assets, people, and/or activities to a third party vendor,
who in exchange provides and manages assets and services for monetary returns over an agreed time period (Lacity
and Hirschheim 1993; Loh and Venkatraman 1992).
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Understanding the relationship that arises in IT outsourcing is  vital, since it comes about not only through the
operationalization of the contract, but also as a natural consequence of the resulting issue of dependency (Grover et
al. 1995; IDC and School 1994; Kern and Willcocks 1996; Kirkpatrick 1991; McFarlan and Nolan 1995).  Paradoxi-
cally, the area in the IT outsourcing literature that has received the least research attention so far is the outsourcing
relationship and more precisely the characteristics that determine such a relationship.  A few  notable exceptions such
as Klepper (1993, 1994, 1995), McFarlan and Nolan (1995), Willcocks and Choi (1995), and Willcocks and Kern
(1997) have carried out initial research into the area, but still there remains little work that covers an IT outsourcing
relationship holistically.
The research presented here discovered a plethora of  relationship approaches in interorganizational relationship
theory, marketing theory, and the management literature, but no one approach was found applicable in its entirety
without undergoing major amendments.  This paper, therefore, presents an eclectic theoretical framework that
integrates the notions of social exchange theory and social contract theory to explain the properties of an IT
outsourcing relationship.  It begins with a review of the literature on existing relationship approaches within both
the information system and management arenas, which led to the conclusion that a notion of exchange underpins the
majority of business-to-business relationships.  Next, a brief discussion of social exchange theory and social contract
theory elucidates the conceptual underpinning of the gestalt of the IT outsourcing relationship model presented here.
Finally, research into how six client and five vendor companies handle the outsourcing relationship gives some initial
indication of the validity of the model.
2. EXISTING RELATIONSHIP APPROACHES
The search through the IS literature for dyadic relationship approaches that could be used to explain the client/vendor
relationship in outsourcing revealed a set of promising explanatory approaches (see Table 1).  However, on closer
analysis, it was discovered that these would have major problems if employed.  The relationship approaches generally
lacked a substantial theoretical base which could be accessed to explain the conceptual origin and characteristics of
an IT outsourcing relationship.  More importantly, though, it was found that the approaches tended to be solely of
a theoretical nature and, in the majority of cases, did not consider the contract to be an integral part of a business
relationship.  Although the approaches covered a range of factors that are fundamental to an outsourcing relationship,
the majority would have explanatory problems and require major amendments to be useful, something also found
by Willcocks and Choi.
Klepper (1993, 1994, 1995), McFarlan and Nolan, Willcocks and Choi, and Willcocks and Kern are so far the only
researchers to explicitly recognize the importance of an IT outsourcing relationship and are the only ones to have
made an attempt at explaining partnering in outsourcing.  Klepper (1994, 1995) employs two existing theoretical
relationship approaches—Anderson and Narus (1990) and Dwyer et al. (1987)—from the marketing field to describe
an outsourcing relationship.  The problem Klepper encounters, however, is the dilemma between theory and practical
reality. Both marketing models are of a conceptual nature, so when Klepper attempts to apply the Dwyer et al. model
without amending it appropriately, his findings turns out to be inconclusive. In the end, he is forced to concede that
“in the future an effort should be made to combine elements of several theories to obtain a better understanding of
the mechanisms by which partnerships evolve and how this process can be managed” (1995, p. 257).
Following Klepper’s advice, a search through the literature identified interorganizational relationship theory,
marketing theory, and general management literature as the predominant areas for explanatory approaches that
described the development and intricacies of interfirms relationships (see Table 2).  However, closer analysis of the
approaches revealed that only four of the approaches actually considered the contract, whereas only White and
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Levine (1961) and Dwyer et al. addressed it explicitly.  As already discussed, the contract in outsourcing regulates
the venture and builds the foundation.  If any approach were to be applicable, it would need to incorporate the
contract. The analysis also highlighted that only four relationship frameworks had actually undergone empirical
validation. Cases researched by  Klepper (1995) and by Willcocks and Choi have clearly illustrated the problems,
contradictions, and sometimes tautological nature of theoretical models when applied to academically researched
sets of circumstances.
However, looking at the conceptual origin that underpins the vast variety of relationship contexts, from trade
associations to buyer-seller relationships, it became evident that the notion of exchange is predominant. This might
imply that exchange is the underlying reason that guides the formation of business relationships, which would be true
in many situations for an IT outsourcing venture.
Table 1.  IS Literature on Dyadic Relationships
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3. TOWARD A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:  SOCIAL EXCHANGE
AND CONTRACT THEORY
The underlying concept of IT outsourcing is the acquisition of services and/or products through continuous interac-
tions between the parties to the agreement.  Most IS researchers studying outsourcing and looking to support their
research theoretically point toward Williamson’s (1979, 1981) transaction cost  theory  (TCT)  for  an explanatory
framework.  However, TCT at its core views the actor (i.e., person or company) as dealing not with other actors but
directly with the market, which in this context of discussing the client/vendor relationship is entirely inappropriate.
Emerson (1972) substantiates the view of this paper by explaining that “in economic theory, decisions are made by
actors not in response to, or in anticipation of, the decision of another party but in response to environmental
parameters.”  Thus, to explain the outsourcing relationship, more than an economic view is needed; an understanding
of the episodes of exchanges from an individual’s standpoint, which is guided by the contract but might lapse into
voluntary exchanges (Hakansson 1982) is needed.  White and Levine found that the structure of exchange episodes
can be simplistically characterized by four main dimensions: (1) the parties to the exchange; (2) the kinds and
quantities exchanged; (3) the agreement underlying the exchange; and (4) the direction of the exchange, which in
many cases defines the focus of the relationship.
Social exchange theory, as formalized by Blau (1964), Cook (1977), Emerson (1972), Homans (1961), and Thibaut
and Kelley (1959) explains dyadic exchange relations as consisting of “voluntary transactions involving transfer of
resources between two or more actors for mutual benefit.”  Exchange actions, in other words, are contingent on
rewarding reactions from others, but as White and Levine emphasize, it does not connote “reciprocity.”  Exchanges
can be solely unidirectional action.  The core concept of social exchange theory is the longitudinal exchange relation
between two specific actors.  It focuses directly on the social process of give-and-take in people’s relations and aims
to understand the behavior of each actor contributing to the exchange.  The reason for employing exchange theory
is to understand the underlying social structures, which after all “are structures composed of the social relations
among actors, whether these actors are individual or collective” (Cook 1977).  Homan’s dyadic focus identifies an
individual’s psychological factors for exchanging, which Blau then extends to analyze the single parts to an exchange
relation and eventually uses to explain the whole relationship.  According to Rogers-Gillmore (1987), Blau provides
a vision where “the whole can be greater than the sum of its parts, while at the same time proceeding from the parts
to useful insights about the whole.”
Social exchange theory has the potential, as Blau (1987) explains, to “dissect the transaction process to explain the
interdependent contingencies in which each response is dependent on the other’s prior action and is simultaneously
the stimulus evoking the other’s further reaction.”  In the context of an outsourcing venture, the actual operationaliza-
tion of the contract guides these prior, but also future, actions, which, when combined, introduce a certain amount
of predictability into the relationship.  The interdependent contingencies are evident in the contract and are further
explored by Macneil’s (1974) relational contract theory.
3.1 Social Contract Theory
The nature of a contract, according to Macneil (1974, 1978, 1980), evolves from the four principles of society:
specialisation of labor, exchange, choice, and awareness of the future.  The labor force within society has continued
to specialize over the centuries to such an extent that individuals and/or companies no longer produce for themselves
everything they need to thrive.  They have become dependent on exchanges with others for products/services.  The
level of choice individuals and/or companies have among a range of exchanges explains the extent of freedom they
enjoy.  However, without an awareness of the future, a contract defining these exchanges is not worth pursuing, since
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consciousness of the future determines the need for a contract.  A contract is “no more and no less than the relations
among parties to the process of projecting exchange into the future” (Macneil 1980).
Macneil (1974) proposes that one should look toward exchange as an activity, tangible or intangible, and more or
less rewarding or costly, that arises between at least two individuals and/or companies.  Macneil (1978) found that
his explanation of exchange—voluntary actions of individuals that are motivated by the returns they are expected
to bring and typically do in fact bring from others—is very similar to that of the exchange theorists (Blau and
Homans, among others).  However, the integration of ongoing reciprocal exchange with classical and neoclassical
contract theory is severely restricted by law.  He thus proposes revamping contract theory so that it caters to prior
and future actions of individuals participating in such an exchange relation.  This can be achieved through conjoining
the behavioral or normative issues with the legal dogmas of contract theory into a new modern relational contract.
However, specifying in detail exchange relations is understandably complex as they have to cover various unspecified
obligations.  This becomes even more complicated when considering that “relational exchange participants can be
expected to derive complex, personal, non-economic satisfactions and continue to engage in social exchange” (Dwyer
et al. 1987).  Macneil (1978) found that, in a relational exchange contract, not all the transfers to  be made now, or
in the future, can be agreed upon at the time of contract signing.  A classical or neoclassical contract cannot dictate
the specific exchanges to be made for a long term into the future, since it lacks the flexibility needed to deal with
changes.  The dilemma here is that a contract is neither self-enforcing nor self-adjusting, but fundamental for an
outsourcing relationship (Goldberg 1980).
In essence, relational exchange, but also social exchange theory, is concerned with the reciprocal expectations of
some future return, which affect both the behavior of the individuals and, in the contractual context, the achievement
of the terms stipulated.  Macneil (1974) postulates that a bi-party agreement should regulate the contractual relation
along 12 key dimensions (Table 3), which Dwyer et al. categorized into situational and process characteristics.  These
dimensions outline the individual parts and, to a certain extent, the underlying structure of the exchange relation.
Dissecting the contract, as Blau suggested, provides a useful insight into the individual relationships, but also the
whole relationship.  In other words, the dimensions presented by Macneil are useful for theoretical substantiation,
but also for analyzing the gestalt of a modern contractual relationship, i.e., an IT outsourcing venture.  Essentially,
they elucidate those contractual characteristics (situational) that are integral to the normative (process) development
of a relationship, but may vary from contract to contract.
In retrospect, the fact that social contract theory integrates notions of social exchange theory makes it a strong
contender for a general theoretical framework that can explain outsourcing ventures in its own right, but more
importantly it provides us with an starting point for discussing the gestalt of an outsourcing relationship.
4. DISCUSSION OF THE GESTALT OF AN IT OUTSOURCING RELATIONSHIP
From the previous review and the consideration of research into IT outsourcing, it was possible to develop an
exploratory model illustrating the structural determinants of an IT outsourcing relationship (see Figure 1).  Applicable
to both the vendor’s and client’s point of departure, the model elucidates those factors that characterize the nature
of an outsourcing relationship and the likely behavioral traits of the parties involved.  It also indicates the focus of
an outsourcing relationship, either contractual or normative or both.  The eclectic origin of the exchanges in the
model allows us to draw on a robust theoretical foundation.  However, the outsourcing relationship should not be
considered solely a reciprocal interorganizational relationship, as many exchanges will occur unilaterally as
compliance of the vendor to the contract.
Gestalt of an IT Outsourcing Relationship
43
Table 3.  Modern Contractual Relationship Elements
Contractual Elements Extreme Relational Exchange
Situational Characteristics 
• Development of exchange
(Commencement, duration and termination)
• Long-term; beginning of agreement traces back to previous
agreement; gradual development; exchange is longer in dura-
tion, reflects on ongoing process; gradual dissolution.
• Number of parties involved • At least two, but often more.
• Obligations
(Sources of content, sources of obligation,
and specificity of obligation)
• Content and sources (external and internal) of obligations are
promises made in the relation, and influenced by law and cus-
tom. Obligations are customized, detailed and administered
within the relation, if breakdown may become transactional.
• Expectations of relation • Trust and efforts of unity counterbalance conflicts of interest
and future problems. Cooperation aids in solving conflicts.
Process Characteristics
• Personal relations 
(Social interaction and communication)
• Important personal, non-economic satisfactions derived; both
formal and informal communication mechanisms are exten-
sively used.
• Contract
(Legal regulation of exchange behavior to
ensure performance and consistency)
• Strong emphasis on legal and self-regulation; satisfactions
cause internal adjustments.
• Transferability
(The power to transfer rights, obligations, and
satisfaction to other parties)
• Limited transferability; exchange is heavily dependent on the
identity of the parties involved.
• Cooperation
(Joint efforts at performance and planning) 
• Relation entirely dependent on further cooperation in both per-
formance and planning over time.
• Adjustments
(The process and mechanisms for coping with
change and conflicts; bindingness)
• Focus on the process of exchange; planning of structure and
processes of relation; future exchanges planned within possible
new environments, “joint creative effort” in planning; planning
on certain issues binding, covers flexibility though.
• Measurement and specificity
(Calculation and assessment of exchanges)
• Significant attention is given to measuring, specifying, and
quantifying all aspects of performance and exchanges, although
difficult at times. Future benefits are considered.
• Power
(The ability to impose one’s intentions on
others).
• Division of benefits and burdens
(The extent of sharing risks and rewards)
• Increased dependence increases the importance of power in ex-
change relation.
• Division of benefits and burdens
(The extent of sharing risks and rewards)
• Undivided sharing of risks and rewards, and adjustments to ca-
ter for future sharing of risks and rewards.
Adapted from Macneil (1974, 1978, 1980) and Dwyer et al. (1987).
The gestalt of the model is purposely arranged to illustrate the key exchanges and the working context between
Company A (vendor) and Company B (Client).  The exchanges vary in their nature of either contractual or normative,
which are pervaded by factors that affect both the working climate and behavior of the individual. To emphasize the
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Figure 1.  Outsourcing Relationship Model
developmental process, the model is based on a time continuum.  Success of a relationship relies chiefly on the level
of customer satisfaction, decreased cost, increased quality of services, and, more importantly, longevity of the venture
(Stralkowski and Billon 1988).
The outsourcing relationship depends largely on the initial contractual stage, since it greatly influences the quality
of the relationship (Fitzgerald and Willcocks 1994a; Lacity and Hirshheim,1993).  The contract and/or service level
agreement specifies in detail the exchanges of services and/or products, financial matters, service enforcement and
monitoring methods, communication and/or information exchanges, key contact points, and general working context.
The exchanges can be characterized by such dimensions as timeliness, value, regularity, quality, and content.
Additionally, regularity of exchanges provides the medium through which firms can slowly begin to change their
relationship, i.e., from contractual to a cooperative (Easton 1992).
Early realization of the stipulated elements in the contract is dependent on good communication between the
participants, as only through ongoing exchanges of information can either side fulfill its legal obligations, achieve
expectations and satisfaction, avoid conflicts, facilitate solutions to problems, reduce uncertainty levels, and ensure
flexibility (Aiken and Hage 1968; Easton 1992).  Flexibility at the contractual level is absolutely fundamental, since
adjustments, changes, and investments that were not foreseeable in the initial agreement have to be made to ensure
the venture progresses.  For that, the communication mechanisms commonly employed are daily interactions, and
possibly weekly, monthly, or yearly meetings with the steering committee overseeing the whole outsourcing venture.
Formal communication in this context is characterized by hard facts such as technical, legal, or commercial data,
whereas informal communication is more likely to be personal, supportive, or soft data (Hakansson and Snehota
1995).  Additionally, communication leads to greater trust and, contrastingly, greater trustworthiness can cause
improved formal and informal communication levels (Anderson and Narus 1990; Dwyer et al. 1987). Hence,
meaningful communication is a necessary antecedent of trust.
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In parallel, cultural adaptations are mutually initiated to smooth the transition to a working (i.e., normative)
relationship.  Cultural adjustments may not be explicit, since they evolve gradually, as the two cultural distances
between the participating organizations move closer (Ford 1980).  The process is largely a task of communication,
cooperation, and developing trust in the counterpart.  According to Forsgen et al. (1995), adaptations take place in
attitudes, rules, norms, knowledge, and corporate strategies.  They can be manifested in various ways, although most
clearly in the common language created between the staff.  This is important as the visible running of the operation
can be integrated quite easily in a relationship, but the unwritten norms that are part of an organization can only be
grasped through a phasing-in period and/or a process of adaptation.  Fitzgerald and Willcocks (1994b) found that a
degree of cultural understanding, an element of flexibility regarding the contract, and a notion of fair deal has to exist
in outsourcing relations.  Problems in ventures tend to arise when the parties involved do not share the same social
and cultural traits/norms.  To enact, follow, and resist these rules and norms is what makes the individual corporate
culture (Mills and Murgatroyd 1991).  These complex “rites and rituals of corporate life” pose difficulties during
change initiatives (Deal and Kennedy 1982), since changes to these values requires time for staff to adjustment.  In
various cases the differences in culture cause a level of anxiety in employees.
Pursuing a successful relationship will in part require inv stments such as time, knowledge, and resources from both
the client and vendor (Johanson 1994).  These investments are specific to the relationship, but the returns obtained
can be such that they include the rendering of current transactions, increase the accumulation of knowledge, and
improve control.  The knowledge acquired may, for example, cover the level of technical, administrative, or logistical
competence of the partner (Easton 1992).  Therefore, any type of investment signals strong commitment, since the
economic consequences that the party will incur if the relationship ends is quite considerable (Cassel 1996; Shankar
1994).
Investments may necessitate awareness of the client company’s vision, which in this context is characterized by the
purpose for being, cultural beliefs and values, mission, goals, and objectives (Thornberry 1997).  The vision needs
to be shared and both parties need to exhibit ownership to ensure the IT services delivered complement its achieve-
ment.  Initially, the vision may need adapting, and as time passes alteration, to ensure the service and expertise
available from the vendor is fully integrated.  On achievement of mutually agreed goals and objectives, the vision
may need adapting to cover future goals and objectives.
Normative exchanges in the relationship are evident between individuals from both sides who formed social and
personal bonds.  Social ties provide an already existing network through which coalitions can be built, but strong
bonds engender trust and compliance (Rogers-Gillmore 1987).  A bond between two firms implies tying together
of relations between partners (Easton 1992).  Strong bonding is dependent upon the satisfaction of each partner with
the other.  Thus, the development of the relationship depends on social and personal bonds, so much so that
alleviation of conflicts, achieving satisfaction, and continuing adaptation all depend to a certain extent on the
closeness of the bonds between the individuals.  In certain cases, the strength of the personal and social bond
transcends and even replaces the economic focus, thus determining the raison d’être for the flourishing of the
relationship.
4.1 Working Context
The various exchanges occurring within both levels depend largely upon the atmosphere that pervades the overall
outsourcing deal.  It can be characterized by commitment and trust, satisfaction and expectations, cooperation and
conflict, and power and dependency. These can be operational simultaneously at every point of time in the relation-
ship, but may also arise at intervals and in problem situations.
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Commitment and trust are interdependent, as greater commitment leads to greater trust and vice versa.  The
commitment of either party to the relationship is a clear indication that the party is serious about achieving success
and is willing to exert effort on behalf of the relationship (Mohr and Spekman 1996).  Commitment in an outsourcing
relationship might be measurable by the vendor’s allocation of specific people to the contract, the regularity with
which the service team interacts with the client, the frequency with which the service team might change, and any
other adaptations.  Trust grows with commitment and it starts with taking the risk to trust the other party. As
experience with the partner develops, trust will evolve.  Trust is the belief that a party’s word is reliable and that it
will fulfill its obligation as stipulated in the agreement, by acting predictably and fairly (Anderson and Narus 1990;
Mohr and Spekman 1996).  Fairness encompasses two key aspects: the perceived fairness of the outcomes received
and the perceived fairness of the vendor’s process for managing the relationship (Kumar 1996), the latter implying,
for example, the number of experts the vendor commits to handling the relationship.
Once a party develops trust in the other, a pattern of commonality arises and both parties will become increasingly
ready to work cooperatively toward established goals and objectives (Brunard and Kleiner 1994).  Hence, trust could
be assessed by whether mutual goals and/or objectives have been established, what time frame these cover, and in
which interval these are revised.  Regardless of how deeply two partners trust each other, there will always be areas
of difference, as the two parties inevitably will have some goals that are specific to their interest (Kumar 1996).
Therefore, trust as a construct in an outsourcing relationship tends to be less intensive, and involve lower personal
commitment, than interpersonal relations in general (Anderson and Narus 1990).
Satisfaction in the outsourcing relationship will come about naturally with the achievement of the client’s expecta-
tions.  Misalignment of ambitions and expectations is often found to be the root cause of problems (Vowler 1996).
To avoid such mishaps, ongoing communication is vital to manage each other’s expectations by taking care
dissatisfaction is kept at a minimum (Lacity et al. 1994).  The expectations are partly defined by the service level
agreements, the contract, and the client’s initial outsourcing strategy terms, but will also depend on how the vendor
reacts and responds to demands and changes made by the client.  Satisfaction can be defined as “a positive affective
state resulting from the appraisal of all aspects of a firm’s working relationship with  another firm” (Anderson and
Narus 1990, p. 66).  The pursuit of mutual benefits increases the client’s perception of closeness and trust in the
partner.  The closenss and achievement of expectations affords a strong feeling of “chemistry” and result in
satisfaction with the vendor (Kumar 1996).  Satisfaction with the outcomes increases the vendor’s trustworthiness
over time and determines the overall successfulness of the relationship.
Cooperation underpins the relationship and depends, according to Axelrod (1984), on four strategic elements:
(1) avoid unnecessary conflict by cooperating, as long as the other party does; (2) avoid provocation in the face of
conflict; (3) practice forgiveness after provocation; and (4) practice clarity of behavior so the other party can adapt
to your behavior.  Obviously, key to the effectiveness of these strategies is durability of the relationship, but generally
long-term operation of the relationship justifies cooperative operation at any point in time.  This is “based on the
assumption that if parties can negotiate minimal, congruent expectations for a cooperative inter-organizational
relationship, they will make commitments to an initial course of action” (Van  De Ven and Ring 1994, p. 99).  The
course of action depends on interactions occurring between individuals within the context of an overall relationship
that persists over time.  Punishing non-cooperatives at any point in time creates hostility, diminishes social solidarity,
breaks down satisfaction and trust (Rogers-Gillmore 1987).  This should be avoided as much as possible.
Power-play in outsourcing relations is mainly a result of dependency and tends to cause a power-control dilemma
(Easton 1992).  Power-dependency becomes evident through the influence one party can exert over the other
(Cunningham and Tynan 1993).  However, power is dependent on the interests of the parties in the exchange
relationship.  In total outsourcing deals, the vendor will dominate the relationship as the client is totally dependent
Gestalt of an IT Outsourcing Relationship
47
on services from the vendor.  In selective outsourcing, the situation may be more balanced.  Generally, though, a
dependency automatically takes shape once a company has transferred a significant amount of assets and/or staff.
5. CASE STUDIES
5.1 Research Approach
Following the construction of the theoretical model, the research aimed at improving and validating the model by
investigating client and vendor relationship practices in private companies in British industry.  To achieve this, client
companies that had outsourced for at least one year and their vendor(s) were contacted in late 1996.  It was found
that a qualitative research method of multiple respondents covering the of perspective both parties would be best for
validating the model, since the understanding of the outsourcing relationship in this research project depended on
the “knowledge of reality as socially constructed by the individual human actors” (Walsham 1995).  Additionally,
there was a need to use multiple informants to ensure a high validity of results of organizational properties (Phillips
1981). Thus, multiple triangulation was to become crucial to ensure anything more than a partial perspective on the
IT outsourcing relationship (Denzin 1970).
5.2 Research Method
Using a semi-structured interview protocol, a series of interviews were undertaken with a range of participants,
including IT managers, contract managers, account executives, general managers, and support managers in both
customer and vendor companies in the early months of 1997.  Questions addressing the contract, post-contract
management, relationship management, the nature of a working relationship, and the evolution of a relationship were
posed, with a strong emphasis on what characteristics influenced the operationalization of the contract.  The
interviews were scheduled for one hour but in many cases lasted anywhere up to three hours.  All of the interviews
were tape-recorded and transcribed, after which the responses from the client and the vendor companies were
grouped together into subject categories by applying a “data display” method (Miles and Huberman 1994).  The
resulting checklist matrices of the subject categories were then classified into areas of agreement and commonality
and into sets of disagreement and problems.  The areas of agreement that illustrated a within-group similarity
identified those variables which underpinned the outsourcing relationship and also provided the means for further
subjective cross-case analysis.  In some instances, it was possible to cross-case analyze the client company’s response
with their respective vendor company’s response.  The interviews formed the basis for about 11 case studies, which
were corroborated by the collection and the ensuing analysis of relevant documentation, including internal memos,
minutes of meetings, and outsourcing contracts.  Table 4 presents an overview of the client and vendor companies
researched.
5.3 Summary of Findings
Throughout the interviews, both the client and vendor companies continually stressed the importance of the
relationship in IT outsourcing.  When interviewees were asked to indicate the type of relationship, either contractual,
close, or partnering, the majority positioned them as being either totally contractual focused or beginning to move
toward partnering, i.e., operating within the “spirit of the contract” (see Table 4).  Interestingly, the vendor companies
were found most keen to emphasize the importance of partnering, even though a recent study by the Meta-Group
revealed their rather meager partnering capabilities (see Table 4).  Nevertheless, the general move toward a closer
relationship was endorsed by both the client and vendor as fundamental, since actual enforcement of the contract
comes about only through working together.  Client E emphasized that “the contract defines how you are going to
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work more than anything else, but you then still have to make it work. The contract is just paper, it’s people that
make things work. It gives them the guidelines, the stepping stones, the structure.”  Client E’s view is supported by
Vendor C, who found that “the contract determines how one faces the relationship and certainly the things you go
for and things you don’t go for.”
However, the outsourcing relationship is always dependent on the sourcing context.  “The nature of the contract
depends enormously on what it is you contracted for” (Client A).  In cases of easily definable services and products,
the relationship may not extend much beyond that of contractual or service level agreement focus.  However, others
see the potential in outsourcing as leading toward partnerships or even strategic  relationships because, as Client C
stressed, 
You get more strength out of an IT outsourcing relationship if you are making it more a partnership,
strategic relationship.  [However,] you can only have a partnership if both parties are equally strong
and equally capable of balancing it. The most creative partnerships come through two very strong
players.
Oddly, this view was not endorsed by its vendor (Vendor A).  Similarly, Vendor D emphasized that Partnership is
overused and what you actually have is a contract where there is a clear required supply from the supplier, there is
clear money that has to be paid, and there are various clauses and termination clauses and so forth.  People talk about
partnerships because it sounds cozy and it’s good from the point of relationship building.
The inherent dilemma of going down a track of partnering, however, is that the closer the parties get, the more
difficult it becomes for the client company to retain control.
For [a] partnership to really work, the business half of the partnership has to be in the hands of
business leadership who themselves are sufficiently literate about information management, and
know how it is an integral part of business strategies, so that they have a strong grasp on the steering
wheel. [Client C]
So, the contract builds the foundation, defining the services, products, and financial exchanges.  It guides the initial
“honeymoon phase,” but once the one-off transition phase has been completed, normally after six months to one year,
the actual day-to-day running takes over (Vendors A, B, and E).  Service level agreements at this stage become
closely monitored, since they can be easily measured and enforced.  The objective measures are clearly determined
by service levels and performance measures, which illustrate whether the supplier is achieving stipulated contract
terms (Clients A, E, and F).  But they do not indicate whether the user community is satisfied.  Hence, subjective
measures also deem consideration, which are dealt with by user satisfaction surveys and question and answer type
sessions (Vendors A and E).  Recent findings were mostly of dissatisfaction in the user community (Clients A, B,
D, and F), which seemed strange since service levels had been met in many cases by vendors (Vendors A, B, D, and
E).  To improve user satisfaction, clients found that vendors need to have a greater understanding of their business
and to show more commitment, and should possibly initiate investments beyond the terms stipulated in the agreement
to ensure that the working relationship is maintained.
[Vendors] have got to have an intense commitment to understanding their customer, what the
customer’s requirements are, what the customer’s drivers are.  They’ve got to have this ability to sit
as much as possible in the customer seat and understand the world from the customer’s viewpoint.
[Client F]
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Only through high satisfaction levels can confidence in the vendor be built, which ultimately leads to trust.  Trust
was emphasized as key by all of the vendors and by the majority of client companies.  Vendor A went so far as to
suggest that, “in business, you can only build trust, we believe, by delivering something hard, delivering particular
benefits or maximizing value,” which can then be measured by satisfaction and other means.
Delivery and monitoring of products and/or services was found to be the fundamental driver of the relationship for
the client, since “in the very hard nosed atmosphere we are in nowadays, unless you can articulate the performance
change and say this company’s contribution to that is very clear, and this is what they want to gain, then it won’t
stand much scrutiny at the time” (Client F).  To ensure smooth operation, clients suggested identifying and/or
establishing a communication structure in the form of key contact people.  In cases where staff have been transferred,
the residual IS group will pose as a key intermediary, which ultimately needs to be replicated by the vendor.  The
clients stressed that the key contacts in the vendor company were actually those people who acted as the drivers for
the client/vendor relationship.  Thus, in those instances when contract managers on either side are moved, a whole
new relationship has to be built. 
So, you lose a relationship there and you have to try and rebuild. We have rebuilt many and it’s very
dependent on the outsourcing company’s account manager, who is the main source of information
for us.  If they keep changing, then the relationship keeps changing. But in general we manage to
keep a reasonable relationship with these people.  I think the main problem in outsourcing is the
change in personnel. [Client B]
The importance of the contact points is in their function of information dispersion and as an exchange role.
Communication as such was found to underpin the relationship, so much so that only through communication were
problems identified and alleviated, distances covered, and cultural adaptation catered for.  “The basic things:  are you
getting the level of dialogue that really ensures that you’ve got a supplier who is working hard to understand you and
your business, where you are, and to see where they can respond constructively, creatively” (Client D).  Good
communication was also identified as an indicator of whether the relationship was functioning:
If they miss a target date and I don’t know about it until after they miss the target date, then there’s
something wrong with the relationship.  If they were having problems somewhere, [then I should
have been] informed early enough so that we could jointly agree what actions to take to either
minimize the damage or remove the problem. [Client E]
A successful relationship, as both vendors and clients explained, is identifiable by the way it handles conflict
situations.  In those circumstances where problems do arise, both sides need to cooperate to resolve them.  One of
the underlying factors that come to the front in such conflict situations is cultural fit between the organizations.
No one must ever underestimate that culture is a lot of things, it’s mainly to do with the national
background, it may be to do with the way you both think....You can have incompatible cultures but
they only tend to work when you’ve got this kind of procurement type of arrangement because you
then have to write it all down.  [Vendor E]
The mutual adaptation of culture tends to occur over time.  In the early stages of a contract, the cultures of the two
parties may clash.  The adaptation then comes about without having to take strict measures at changing; it is more
a process of developing a working relationship and good communication.  In cases where staff have been transferred,
the culture clash for those people is enormous, whereas for the client company buying the service back, the culture
difference is at a minimum, due to buying its services back from former employees.  In many situations, cultural
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adaptation demands input from both sides, especially to avoid the culture clashes that were found by clients to cause
considerable conflicts.  For example, as Client A discovered, “[The vendor wasn’t] quite as nimble as we were
because they hadn’t been through this reengineering process and that caused an awful lot of conflicts, on both sides.
It was a cultural difference.”
Minimizing the cultural difference and establishing working procedures allows the client to consider integrating the
vendor as a contributor to achieving the company’s goals and objectives.  Clients flagged this issue as complex, as
the parties tend to have different objectives.  However, it is not about the same objectives but about compatible
objectives.
What you want to achieve and what I am trying to achieve with my business, are they compatible?
And therefore is there a shared vision where we might be together in the next five years?  So, it’s
compatible objective, shared vision, that kind of stuff which tells you, you are going to able to work
together. [Vendor E]
This demands that the vendor has an understanding of the client’s business and is culturally aware.  To achieve this,
Vendor C suggests that “what we need to do is have people who are getting close in with the customer, getting to
understand about the business, bringing in the appropriate people from the central group and when in order to put
forward proactive ideas about how IT can be used to bring benefit to the business.”  Ultimately, the mutual goal is
a win/win scenario, where both parties benefit from the outsourcing venture.  In some client cas s, the vendor
contributes to the client company’s future vision of where it wants to go in order to ensure active involvement of the
vendor in achieving the client’s objectives.  Client D explained that “the two parties should be working toward a
common goal and if they are not talking to each other and don’t trust each other they are going to miss whatever the
contract says.”  Similarly, Client F emphasized 
I’m not giving them control of [strategy], I’m saying I will share with you a real understanding of
what our business strategy is so that you are better placed to help me understand the real capabilities
that I need to draw on.  I will make the decisions, my strategy, my responsibility, but I will bring you
into the team closely enough that you really understand what I’m trying to achieve, and therefore
you can really say this particular capability is really going to help you make a big change.  And then
we get into the partnership to make it happen.
Investments in time and resources are inherent to greater integration of the vendor, so much so that relationship
management will demand more time as the relationship develops.
Institutionalization of operational procedures in the outsourcing relationship may involve developing close and
personal relations.  In cases where staff were transferred, these relations already exist and are further reinforced by
ongoing contact and social events.  However, personal relations were found by clients as being particularly helpful
in resolving conflict situations, so much so that getting to know the vendor can have a profound impact on how the
relationship develops.  Client E explained that
The more you get to know a supplier personally the better the overall relationship will work.  What
you have to guard against, and this is the other extreme, is that a bond does develop so that you can
never walk away from that guy.  Because in any customer/supplier relationship, the customer has
to reserve the right to say at some point in time I’ve had enough, for whatever reason this relation-
ship is not working and I want to go somewhere else.  So there is a dividing line there somewhere,
I don’t know where it is, it’s something you can only measure when you go along.  Somehow you
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have to get a relationship which is relatively close and friendly, but on the other hand still gives you
the capability to turn your back on it if you want to.
6. DISCUSSION
The previous section discussed some key findings of the analysis of the responses from interviewees about the crucial
factors in the client/vendor relationship.  The selection of the findings discussed was guided by the proposed model
of a client/vendor relationship.  This section will draw upon the model and its underlying theoretical framework to
assess whether the findings validate and possibly suggest improvements to what initially were found to be the main
characteristics of an IT outsourcing relationship.
The findings indicated that, in most situations, vendors looked more favorably toward developing a closer relation-
ship than clients, simply because they saw a potential for enlarging their service and/or product offerings.  Regard-
less, of whether the outsourcing relationship was perceived as being contractually or partnering focused, it still had
to cover a set of dimensions that included the core terms of the contract.  In general, these were found to be product
and/or service exchange, financial exchanges, service enforcement and monitoring, reports and information to be
exchanged, and the key personnel.  This corresponded to what were identified in the model as being the contractual
focus of the relationship and further corroborated Macneil’s supposition that the contract in business relations today
has a key role to play.
Essentially, both parties agreed that the relationship in outsourcing is an absolute must, because the contract on its
own is neither self-enforcing nor self-adjusting.  Macneil similarly found that today’s classical and neoclassical
contract theory suffers from a rigidness that does not take into account the relational aspect in contracts.  However,
as evident from the findings, the outsourcing contract has to be seen to extend into the relational realms, which were
identified as being the normative characteristics that Macneil outlined in detail in his 12 dimensions (Table 3).
Client  C highlighted how the outsourcing deal transcends the contract into the relational realm:
The contract provides a sub-stratum.  It’s about getting the foundations right.  But to really get the
partnership working and delivering, you’ve got to have the confidence in the personal relationships
and the ways of working together and these processes of working together are very difficult to
capture in the contract.  But the things that you are talking about in a outsourcing partnership are
more about process and relationships and common visions which are difficult things to track in a
contract.
In retrospect, the supposition that the contract is operationalized by the ensuing client/vendor relationship was fully
endorsed by both sides.  Additionally, it was evident that exchanges were occurring that were not contractually
stipulated, strongly indicating the occurrence of “voluntary exchanges” to ensure the continuation of the relationship.
Interestingly, a whole bandwidth of relationships were found in an outsourcing venture, from strictly formal
contractual-based relations to close personal relations between individuals in the companies.  Generally, it seemed
the more effort invested in developing the relationship, the closer and/or more personal the relations became between
managers.  Examples given by individuals from Clients C, B, E, and F about the outsourcing deal and their attitude
toward the other party defined the operation of the whole outsourcing venture.  It was the behavior of the individuals
that defined the working context.  Looking at the working context of the model, it was found strikingly representative
of the behavioral properties that influence and/or characterize how individuals relate to each other in the outsourcing
venture.  Trust and its importance for working together was stressed by Clients B, C, E, and F and by all vendors.
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Before trust could be achieved, however, it was felt that the chemistry between the key personnel operating as the
interface between the parties had to be assured.  It was repeatedly emphasized that those fostering the relationship
will be the key intermediaries and that they have to match on a personality level.  Essentially, the outsourcing
relationship, as Clients B, C, E, and F and Vendor A, C, and E declared, is about the people involved.  Only the
people can make the relationship work and be successful.  Thus, having wrong communicators, as discovered by
Client B and Vendor E, at key interface points can lead to conflicts, dissatisfaction, and eventual breakdown of the
whole outsourcing venture.
In hindsight, looking at the findings from all the interviews, it became evident that the model in the future would have
to integrate the notion of understanding the client’s business and having confidence in the vendor to deliver the
services for which it was contracted.  These subjective factors will undoubtedly influence the smooth enforcement
of the contract over the long-term.  Additionally, it became apparent that fundamental to the overall outsourcing
relationship is awareness at the outset and the intention of the client company.  As Vendor  B and Client E empha-
sized, the outsourcing intention determines in many cases the kind of relationship.  This suggests that the model may
need to include a section that covers the actual context of the outsourcing deal.  This will then set the scene and
clarify from the start the relationship focus, since the outsourcing relationship depends heavily on what is actually
outsourced.
7. CONCLUSION
The aim of this paper was to demarcate the characteristics of a client/vendor relationship of an IT outsourcing
venture. An initial theoretical model underpinned by social exchange theory and contract theory was empirically
explored in both client and vendor companies.  The assumption that the relationship is a major, neglected element
that critically needs managing in an IT outsourcing venture was confirmed by what interviewees from both sides
revealed. Outsourcing success does not depend solely on achieving service levels, but also on the relationship
between the two parties and how this helps them to work toward a win-win situation.  In line with this scenario, the
gestalt of an outsourcing relationship was largely confirmed by industry practice and thus discloses the kind of
properties the client and vendor company need to consider in managing their outsourcing deal.  Using a simple score
card scheme based on a Likert scale, individuals from both the client and vendor company can rate and evaluate their
relationship according to the identified characteristics.  Those characteristics with particular low scores, may require
greater management attention.
Moreover, the issues identified in the discussion section need inclusion in the model.  In general, it was found that
the model represents the main characteristics of a client/vendor relationship.  Of notable interest were some of the
large differences between the perceptions of the clients and their respective vendors of the critical characteristics.
Clearly, the model has its limitations in respect to its static view, but its usefulness can be derived from its heuristic
and analytical potential in a fashion that captures both the outsourcing relationship’s contractual, social, and
economic characteristics, as well as many additional elements.  Further research will develop the framework in a
more dynamic direction, which will be able to track developments over time.
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